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**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP**

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

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INFO.

PAGES

## SUPPLEMENT

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## ORIGIN

## NOTEN UND

1. Chief of the Kunning Detachment is NGUYEN Hung (Chinese Characters: 阮元 Hung). He is thirty-one years old, an Annamese who was brought to Kunning as a child by his parents and has lived there most of his life. In addition to Annamese, he reads and writes French and Chinese; he speaks Annamese, Mandarin and Cantonese fluently, and French adequately. He is married to a Cantonese woman who is now with him in Kunning. He was at one time a member of the Chinese Kuomintang, and was very pro-Chinese. In 1933-34 he attended a Kuomintang BIS Military espionage school in Kunning, for the purpose of receiving training to go under-cover into Indochina to work against the Japanese on behalf of the Chinese Government. This intention was never realized, but the training received by him has stood him in good stead in more recent activities. In 1943 he met HO chi Minh in Liuchow, Kwangsi Province, and again in 1944 in Kunning. He quickly fell under HO chi Minh's spell and secretly joined the Viet Minh. During this period he became intimate with HO chi Minh and received extensive training and indoctrination from HO personally. Thus Hung became a Can Bo without the necessity of passing through most of the formal training to which Can Bo are usually submitted.

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2. In 1945 Hung returned to Indochina and worked for the Viet Minh. From March to June of that year he was employed as an interpreter for the Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The activities of that Ministry at that time consisted principally of dealing with the Chinese Occupational Authorities. In addition to interpreting, Hung was charged with the duty of settling disputes between the Chinese and the local population. His activities at that period centered chiefly in the region between Hanoi and the Chinese border along the Haiphong-Yunnan railway, where the Chinese were attempting to leave confidential agents in strategic positions to exert political and economic influence after the withdrawal of the Chinese Occupational Troops. Under cover of his role in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hung acted as both a political and military Can Bo and was a member of Vietnam National Defense

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Committees of various regions along the railway. In such roles, Hung participated in the military attacks against the Quoc Zan Dang (QDD, Nationalist Front element); and, as the latter withdrew toward China, his activities were deployed in regions successively farther and farther toward the north along the railway. By June 1946, with the final withdrawal of all important QDD elements, his mission was completed and he was sent to Kunming as an undercover agent for the Viet Minh, head of the Viet Minh Kunming Detachment. However, the QDD representatives in Kunming constantly denounced him as a Viet Minh agent. In connection with his present activities he returned several times to Indochina to report and have discussions with the Viet Minh; he was in Hanoi at the time of the French attack in December 1946.

3. In early 1947 he returned to Kunming. The Chinese authorities were at last forced to pay some attention to the denunciations by the QDD, and in April Hung received a visit from some investigators of the Special Branch of the Kunming Military Headquarters who asked him what he was doing in Kunming. He replied that he was living there with his wife who is Chinese. When asked if he had lately been in Indochina, he replied in the affirmative. When asked if he was a member of the Viet Minh, he stated that he was not; but that he might soon join the Vietnam Government. After this questioning by the Chinese authorities, he deemed it wise to "regularize" his position. He therefore went to Lao Kay (103-56,22-30) for a conference with the local Viet Minh headquarters.

As a result of this conference, he received credentials from the Vietnam Government requesting the Chinese authorities to give him all possible assistance and stating that he was charged with looking after the interests and welfare of the 600 or 700 Vietnamese nationals who are at present in Yunnan. He presented these credentials to Governor LU Han. (For Hung's current activities see paragraphs 12-14 below.)

4. Hung is a blind follower of HO chi Minh and, as such, may be considered an efficient piece of machinery. He is incapable of independent political or theoretical thinking. He regards himself (correctly) as essentially a member of the Viet Minh rather than a Communist; but if he were instructed by HO chi Minh tomorrow to become a Communist (or a Democrat or anything else), he would follow the instructions unhesitatingly. Because of Hung's efficiency and loyalty as well as his friendship with HO chi Minh, Hung will probably occupy an increasingly important position in the Viet Minh.
5. Regarding the technique employed by Hung in obtaining intelligence or favors, he is a strong believer in the use of corruption rather than open methods. He has little respect for the loyalty of anyone and no conception of how to make use of the loyalty of others, except his own immediate followers. He believes that everyone, especially all Chinese, are for sale, and he does not hesitate to use the most unscrupulous methods to accomplish his purposes.

#### TRAN Vinh

6. NGUYEN Hung's principal assistant is TRAN Vinh (alias TRAN duc Vinh./Chinese characters: 陳德榮 /CH'EN Te-jung). TRAN Vinh is Annamese, 22 years old, a lifelong resident of Kunming. He attended the Franco-Annamese-Chinese School in Kunming. During July and August 1945 he became a close friend of NGUYEN Hung, and after the Japanese surrender became his assistant. Since that time Vinh's history and activities closely parallel those of NGUYEN Hung. Together with Hung, Vinh has been in close contact with HO chi Minh. Vinh's father, a restaurateur, turned over the restaurant which he owned to Vinh, and it is now known as the Restaurant Tran Vinh, address: 227 T'o Tung Road. This is one of the four Annamese restaurants in Kunming. One of the others, the Indochina Cafe on Ching Pei Road, was HO chi Minh's headquarters during the war and was partially financed by HO

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It was for this reason that anti-Viet Minh propaganda sometimes pictures HO as a "soup merchant". Like the Restaurant Tran Vinh, the Indochina Cafe is still a favorite meeting-place for Viet Minh members. ( ) One of the other Annamese restaurants in Kunming, the Nam-Phong or Nam Feng (Nam Feng/ South Wind) on Ching Pei Road is a favorite meeting-place for the "small fry" of the QMD. Information on the fourth Annamese restaurant in Kunming is not available). Unlike the Indochina Cafe, which required financing by the Viet Minh, the Restaurant Tran Vinh has long been prosperous in its own right and has on many occasions advanced money for Viet Minh activities. 25X1X6

7. Vinh's father, like Vinh himself, is a member of the Viet Minh and is entirely in sympathy with his son's activities. Vinh recently was converted (?) to the Protestant faith and is a member of the YMCA. He reads, writes and speaks Annamese and Mandarin; reads and writes French and English; and speaks a little French and English.

NGUYEN van Mao, and Khang (Fnu)

8. There are two other members of Hung's group, but they are not definitely in Hung's employ—they are active sympathizers and do much valuable intelligence work for him from patriotic motives. They are both employed on the Haiphong-Yunnan railway. They particularly report on railway travel and concurrent activities by members of the Nationalist Front. They also put themselves at Hung's disposal for liaison and surveillance work.
9. One of these men is NGUYEN van Mao, about 32 years old. He is an Annamese, who has lived most of his life in Kunming. Like Vinh, Mao returned to Indo-China with Hung after the Japanese surrender and it was at this time that he became associated with the Viet Minh. He is easily recognized because his right hand is always bandaged and carried in a sling, having received a permanent infection a number of years ago. In addition to Annamese, he reads, writes, and speaks Chinese (Mandarin) fluently; he reads French and speaks it a little. He is employed in the offices of the Haiphong-Yunnan Railway. It is Mao who is charged with the principal responsibility for shadowing and surveillance work. His duties on the railway permit him a good deal of free time, particularly at night; he is thus able to devote sufficient time to surveillance, which he does with energy and skill.
10. The other member of the group is named Khang (family name unknown). He is a conductor on the railway. He is intelligent and educated beyond the ordinary requirements of a railway conductor. He reads, writes and speaks Annamese, Mandarin and French fluently.

#### Activities and Directives

11. The activities of the Kunming Detachment are governed by general directives from the Tong Bo, Directing Committee of the Viet Minh. These directives are as follows:
  - a. Maintain liaison and cordial relations with the local Chinese authorities and the Chinese secret service;
  - b. Assist in procuring certain items of supply for the Viet Minh;
  - c. Watch every move of members of the Nationalist Front and so far as possible neutralize their activities.Within these directives the group is allowed considerable initiative and latitude, which have been in fact justified by Hung's loyalty and ingenuity within his appointed role.
12. Hung and his group are currently fulfilling these directives in the following manner:
  - a. Since the presentation of his new credentials, Hung has established himself on a friendly and cordial basis with LU Han and the other local Chinese officials.

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However, contact with these high officials is naturally of a somewhat formal character and Hung finds that his most useful liaison is close personal friendship with Chinese functionaries and agents on the working level. He cannot hope for large overt favors from the high Chinese officials because of the neutral attitude of the Chinese Government. The most that he can expect from the high local officials—and which he is apparently receiving to date—is a sort of benevolent connivance. Hung has been particularly successful in his relations with the Special Branch of the Kunming Military Headquarters (BIS); because of his own early training in that service he is in a favorable position. He has been able to supplement his own limited resources in personnel by obtaining detailed counter-espionage reports from the Military BIS, particularly on French and Nationalist Front espionage activities. He is the more willing to do so because he has no great regard for the capabilities of either the French or the Nationalist Front along espionage lines and the information received by Hung from the Chinese relieves him of the necessity of pursuing this question himself.

b. Recently, Hung purchased one metric ton of mercury and 3000 American-made hand grenades from Chinese merchants in the Kunming area. The transaction was a secret one—a purely commercial deal with no political significance as far as the Chinese were concerned. The purchases were shipped to Lao Kay via horse-cart by the Chinese and turned over to the Viet Minh in Lao Kay. Other similar transactions which Hung has recently completed involve various ores (lead, tin) as well as supplies of medicines, particularly pharmaceuticals of American manufacture which had found their way into the hands of Chinese dealers. Hung is at present negotiating with Chinese dealers for a large stock of rifles (number, make and price unknown to source).

c. The group, either themselves or through agents or sympathizers, maintain close surveillance over the activities of the Nationalist Front—in addition to that accomplished by the Chinese BIS. All arrivals of Annamese in Kunming are immediately known to the group. The principal concern of the Detachment over present Nationalist Front activities is in connection with the Front's effort to recruit the assistance of "rebel" Chinese along the border and to recruit Chinese troops in the Kunming area.

13. The Vietnam Government allows the Kunming Detachment a budget which is quite sufficient for its needs. [redacted] estimates this budget at a minimum of 50,000 piastres per month). The conversion of Vietnam piastres into Chinese currency offers no particular problem as there is an active exchange market in important centers along the railway. 25X1X6
14. Unlike NGUYEN due Thy, formerly Vietnam Representative in Canton, and HOANG Vinh, formerly Vietnam Representative in Nanking, NGUYEN Hung has no radio communication with the Vietnam Government. This is a serious handicap to him. Because of the recent removal of rails on the railway line between Mengtzu (103-23,23-20) and Lao Kay, and the extensive sabotage of the railway beyond that point, communication with the Vietnam Government by messenger requires at least 12 days. There are also bandits along the railway. Nevertheless, Hung submits a report to the Government at least once a month. He sends the report by messenger; or, if there is an important question pending, he will either go himself or send his assistant Vinh.

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